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The Promise and Limitations of 
International Human Rights Activism 
 
By Rebecca Evans 
 
 
Breaking Silence: The Case that Changed the Face of Human 
Rights by Richard Alan White. Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004. 320 pp. 
 
 
International human rights doctrine and international law have increasingly come to recognize 
that the international community has an interest in and responsibility to uphold fundamental human 
rights. This recognition means that states have come under increasing scrutiny for the way in which 
they treat their own citizens. Although some scholars continue to maintain that universal human 
rights do not challenge national sovereignty or state control (for example, see Krasner 2001), the 
immunity that state officials enjoyed from external interference in their domestic affairs has eroded 
quite significantly over the past fifteen years. As Andrea Bianchi notes, “while state sovereignty 
remains one of the pillars on which the system hinges, its actual content has undergone a gradual 
process of erosion. Matters which once indisputably belonged to the domestic jurisdiction of states, 
such as the way a state treats persons under its jurisdiction, nowadays may be the object of 
international scrutiny” (Bianchi 1999: 117). While realists dismiss such scrutiny as meaningless and 
ineffectual, they fail to recognize that casting a spotlight on violations of internationally recognized 
human rights is the first step in holding violators accountable for their actions. Although it 
ultimately remains the responsibility of national governments to make respect for human rights 
effective, the international human rights community wields significant power in its ability to “name 
and shame” violators. This “power to embarrass” is significant because “no government wishes to 
suffer the exposure of systematic human rights violations by agencies under its authority or its 
failure to fulfill obligations to which it has agreed” (Pinheiro 1998: 42). 
Governments that violate their citizens’ human rights are increasingly being held responsible for 
their actions by other governments and by international bodies. On the international level, tribunals 
have been established to try perpetrators of crimes against humanity from Yugoslavia to Rwanda to 
Sierra Leone. The formal initiation of a permanent International Criminal Court in 2002 signals a 
growing willingness on the part of many states to hold heads of state and other public officials 
accountable for their actions, although the United States remains a notable opponent.1 On the 
national level, criminal prosecutions and civil claims have been filed in domestic courts against 
foreign officials accused of violating international human rights norms. Courts in countries such as 
                                                 
1 The United States has refused to ratify the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court and took the 
unprecedented step of withdrawing its signature from the treaty in order to signal its strong opposition. The United 
States’ primary concern is that the Court would infringe upon U.S. sovereignty and subject American politicians and 
military personnel to prosecution. For an explanation of this position, see Rubenfeld (2003). 
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France, Spain and Belgium have embraced the principle of universal jurisdiction and have used this 
to claim “criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the 
crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the 
victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction” (Scott 2001: 267). This was 
dramatically demonstrated in the legal proceedings against former Chilean General Augusto 
Pinochet, who was detained by British authorities for eighteen months pursuant to an extradition 
request from a Spanish court. In a landmark 1999 decision, a British panel of judges ruled that 
crimes against humanity, such as the systematic torture of individuals for policy reasons, canceled 
the sovereign immunity traditionally granted to heads of state (Méndez 2001: 25). More recently, a 
Spanish court has convened a genocide trial of a former captain in the Argentine navy accused of 
involvement in the “dirty war” that led to the deaths and disappearances of tens of thousands of 
Argentines. 
Although U.S. foreign policy leaders have been conspicuously unsympathetic to the creation of 
the International Criminal Court and have objected to the application of universal jurisdiction, there 
have nonetheless been momentous rulings in U.S. courts that have had important implications for 
international human rights law. The recently published book Breaking Silence: The Case that 
Changed the Face of Human Rights by Richard Alan White looks at just such a case. In the case of 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala (1980), a U.S. federal judge ordered a former Paraguayan police officer living in 
the United States to pay $10 million to the family of Joel Filártiga, a Paraguayan citizen who was 
tortured and killed by police in 1976. The judgment was based upon a new interpretation of a statute 
dating back to 1789—the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). The ATCA allows aliens living within the 
United States to file civil claims in U.S. courts against foreign nationals who violate international law, 
particularly by committing human rights abuses (Quigley 1998: 557). 
Rather than providing an academic or legal analysis of this landmark decision, however, Breaking 
Silence focuses on the personal story of the human rights activists in Paraguay and abroad whose 
determination ultimately led to a symbolic victory for human rights. The book does so in a way that 
the author describes as “dramatic nonfiction” (xix) and one reviewer praises for “putting the human 
back into the study of human rights” (Claude 2004: 790). Rather than assume the more detached 
perspective of a traditional academic researcher, White deliberately makes his account highly 
subjective. Although he notes in the prologue that the book is based on some 12,000 pages of 
documentation from primary and secondary sources, he recounts events in the first-person, even 
sharing such personal details as his struggle with chronic back pain. Much of the text is written in a 
conversational form that allows the reader to identify with the protagonists in the unfolding drama. 
White’s use of dialogue also has an obvious didactic goal, as the following conversation between the 
author and a Paraguayan insurgent leader illustrates: 
 
“OK,” I began, “international organizations involved in human rights can be divided into two major types. 
Those funded by governments, the UN or the OAS for example. And those privately financed, like Amnesty 
or the International League for Human Rights … They’re called Non-Governmental Organizations. 
NGOs for short.” 
 
“What’s the difference?” Soledad asked. 
 
2
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“As a general rule, the NGOs are made up of activists. Human rights is what they do, their raison d’être,” 
I explained. “Whereas, in the governmental organizations, human rights work is more or less a poor cousin, 
low on the institutional totem pole, almost a concession to their formal mandates …” (77). 
 
Breaking Silence begins by explaining how White came to meet the Filártiga family and situates 
the family in the context of General Stroessner’s repressive, corrupt regime. White makes it clear 
from the outset that Joel Filártiga’s role as a human rights champion stemmed from his experiences 
as a physician working at a rural clinic treating poor peasant farmers. In the black-and-white reality 
of a Third World country like Paraguay, poverty, injustice, exploitation and disease are all undeniably 
linked. Greed and corruption explain why the government does nothing to regulate the use of 
powerful insecticides by big cotton growers even though these cause appendicitis and spontaneous 
abortions among local peasants; children die of common diseases because the government is 
unwilling to spend “ten centavos” for an immunization (6-7, 75).  
Yet while Filártiga ultimately wins financial support for his rural medical clinic from wealthy 
supporters in the United States and Europe, his story comes to international attention not because 
of the violation of socioeconomic rights but because of the torture and murder of Joel’s 17-year-old 
son, Joelito. White notes that his own commitment to the struggle to hold those responsible for 
Joelito’s death accountable stemmed from his “gut level reaction to the mindless inhumanity of the 
torture-murder of Joelito” and “the devastation it wrought upon the family” (23). In the campaign 
to bring international pressure to bear upon the Stroessner regime, White also makes it clear that the 
focus on an individual case was key to winning international support; a photo of Joelito’s “youthful 
body obscenely defiled by torture… became one of our most powerful weapons. It broke down 
people’s psychological defenses, overcoming their apathy, fear and cynicism” (49). This particular 
example reflects a broader reality, as international human rights organizations like Amnesty 
International have consciously decided to focus on rights of the individual rather than 
socioeconomic or ecological rights on the assumption that more people can be moved to support 
individual rights than group rights (Burgerman 1998: 911; Sikkink 1996: 59, 64-65). In addition, 
Joelito made an ideal hero because his circumstances made him especially attractive to the media and 
his family possessed the knowledge, resources and stature to pursue justice, unlike other victims of 
human rights abuses (and other kinds of violence) who have much less of a chance at redress. 
While the Filártiga family’s struggle is at the center of Breaking Silence, White’s account 
concentrates to a large extent on the role of non-state actors in making this case into a human rights 
success story. At various points in the book, White notes that justice is impossible under a repressive 
police state such as Stroessner’s Paraguay. Although the Filártigas courageously launched their own 
criminal complaint in Paraguayan courts, this never held out the prospect of any real justice. While 
the Filártigas influenced public opinion in Paraguay by using the media, White makes it clear that the 
Paraguayan media were not free to directly criticize the regime (147-148). Moreover, even though 
Stroessner wanted to avoid getting the public “so riled up that their outrage would override his 
culture of fear,” the only real threat that worried the regime was the possibility of cuts in foreign and 
military aid (49, 131). 
Not only was international pressure “the best chance of breaking the impasse” (131), but 
international networks proved to be the best vehicle for mobilizing diplomatic pressure. White does 
includes some disclaimers—such as a caveat from an Amnesty International official “that one 
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cannot expect wonders from Amnesty interventions” (15) and protestations that the family “had 
blown out of all proportion anything that I was even remotely capable of doing” (62)—but the 
overriding message in his story is that individuals and non-state actors have the power to make a 
difference. In this respect, White’s conclusions are consistent with analyses by various human rights 
scholars who argue that international advocacy networks, including international and domestic non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), have the power to transform the human rights behavior of 
states by exerting moral pressure at the international and domestic level (Burgerman 1998; 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Although 
NGOs are not powerful in the same way that nation-states or even multinational corporations are, 
human rights advocacy networks do wield considerable influence through their ability to influence 
global opinion and lobby powerful governments to pressure leaders in developing countries to 
comply with international human rights norms. Richard Price also notes that the moral principles 
that international advocacy networks champion are themselves a form of power insofar as “their 
enactment empowers some actors and not others” (2003: 590). Moreover, while international human 
rights NGOs rely heavily on persuasive techniques, they also employ coercive techniques: “shaming 
and boycotts are clearly forms of coercion designed less to persuade than to change the cost calculus 
of targets” (Price 2003: 590). 
Some question the participation of NGOs in international affairs, citing the undemocratic nature 
of such organizations as well as their lack of transparency and accountability (see, for example, Rieff 
1999). Even Jessica Mathews, who praises NGOs for their special ability to deal with “soft” threats 
such as environmental degradation, denial of human rights, etc., also acknowledges that they  
 
are special interests, albeit not motivated by personal profit. The best of them, the ablest and most passionate, 
often suffer most from tunnel vision, judging every public act by how it affects their particular interest. 
Generally, they have limited capacity for large-scale endeavors, and as they grow, the need to sustain growing 
budgets can compromise the independence of mind and approach that is their greatest asset (1997: 64).  
 
Nonetheless, even though NGOs may have their own problems with democracy and transparency, 
their activism reflects the fact that existing governments and institutions have generally been 
unresponsive to calls for greater respect for human rights (Price 2003: 591). 
Since White does not provide much of a tutorial on the function and nature of international 
human rights organizations, it is instructive to look at scholarly analyses of international advocacy 
networks and see how they worked in the case that White describes. For Susan Burgerman, 
domestic and international activists each need the other. Internationally based actors provide 
vulnerable populations with protection as well as vital material resources and other forms of 
assistance (1998: 905, 910). This can clearly be seen in the case of Joel Filártiga, who was able to 
count on protests by influential international supporters in order to protect himself from arrest. 
Burgerman also notes that once international activists become participants in the local system—
living in the community and accompanying domestic actors in their daily activities—they provide a 
kind of safeguard for domestic activists (1998: 909-910). White’s role as a “participant-observer”—
who lives with the family in Asunción as well as the rural clinic—demonstrates this better than 
anything else. At the same time, Burgerman argues that domestic activists are important for outside 
organizations, which need information on local conditions to further their own organizational 
4
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interests (1998: 910). As White describes, Amnesty International’s campaigns require extensive 
documentation and fact-checking in order to guarantee that the organization’s charges are credible; 
in the case of Paraguay, Amnesty depended upon a steady supply of information from reliable local 
sources in order to back up its charges that the regime engaged in widespread human rights 
violations. All in all, White’s discussion of the Filártiga case gives a concrete example of the scholarly 
argument that support for human rights and justice for rights abuses not only require the active 
intervention of international actors but also require the courageous involvement of domestic actors 
(Brysk 1993). 
Beyond the mutual dependency of international and domestic human rights actors, human rights 
scholars emphasize the fact that national leaders must increasingly consider not only the domestic 
but also the international repercussions of their actions (Lutz and Sikkink 2001: 283). In a widely 
discussed theory, Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink have proposed a “spiral 
model” that shows how international norms are able to penetrate spheres that have traditionally 
been controlled by national actors—including human rights policy (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). 
In the first phase of the model repressive governments are not constrained by international human 
rights norms because opposition is too weak to pose a significant challenge and international 
advocacy groups lack sufficient information on repression. Once international advocacy groups 
gather reliable information, however, they put rights violations by targeted regimes on the 
international agenda, thus moving the situation to the second phase of the model. In this second 
phase international public attention increases and the transnational network starts lobbying 
international human rights organizations as well as Western states. The target state typically reacts by 
denying the allegations and rejecting the suggestion that its national practices are subject to 
international jurisdiction in an appeal to national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. 
Despite the target state’s efforts, however, moral pressures make the state vulnerable and lead to the 
third phase, in which the government makes tactical concessions in order to diffuse and deflect 
pressure. In doing so, the government may inadvertently strengthen local networks of human rights 
activists. In addition, officials may unintentionally trap themselves in their own rhetoric, paving the 
way for a transition to the fourth phase. In this phase governments proclaim adherence to human 
rights norms, although some violations continue; it is not until the fifth and final phase where rule-
consistent behavior is assured (Schwarz 2004: 201). 
White’s description of the Filártiga case shows the strengths and weaknesses of this predictive 
model. Certainly, Stroessner’s Paraguay begins as a “neglected tyranny” that traditionally received 
little international attention or criticism (163). As discussed above, international human rights 
organizations faced considerable difficulties collecting sufficient, reliable information about the 
regime’s abuses since local human rights organizations were infiltrated by police informers and 
activists were subject to torture and arrest for anti-regime activities (80). Moreover, the “hard ball 
reality of U.S. foreign policy” meant that the United States supported Stroessner as a head of state 
and ally in the international fight against communism (149). 
Yet thanks to the determined efforts of local activists like Joel Filártiga and international 
advocacy groups, Paraguay’s human rights violations came to be placed on the international agenda. 
Armed with credible, damning evidence, NGOs such as Amnesty International, the International 
League for Human Rights, the Latin American Documentation Center, and the United States 
Catholic Conference of Bishops published scathing attacks on the regime’s abuses. These groups 
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lodged official complaints with the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, triggering a 
process to conduct an on-site investigation. Members of the U.S. Congress were lobbied, and several 
influential congressmen came to support the cause of human rights in Paraguay. International 
attention also came from the domestic and international media blitz that accompanied exhibitions of 
Joel Filártiga’s politically inspired art in Paraguay and abroad. Once Paraguay became a “hot” story, 
White writes that it was relatively easy to get out information, increase public support and keep up 
international pressure on the regime (172). As such, Breaking Silence certainly illustrates the 
successful use of various strategies by transnational advocacy groups that appeal directly to the 
public, mobilize moral outrage through media campaigns, petition international organizations to 
formally investigate human rights violations, and mobilize diplomatic pressure (Burgerman 1998: 
910). 
As predicted by the model, focusing the international spotlight on Paraguay’s human-rights 
record placed the regime in an extremely uncomfortable position. As Robert White, then 
Ambassador to Paraguay, commented to the book’s author: “You know international pressure is the 
only thing Stroessner responds to. And the avalanche these past six months has catapulted him right 
up there along with Idi Amin as the poster boys for cattle prods. The bastards are really worried” 
(163). Faced with the prospect of a mortifying blow to its international reputation, the regime sought 
to deflect this unwanted attention. With respect to the Filártiga case, the regime made token 
concessions to create the illusion that it would uphold the rule of law by allowing the case to 
proceed in Paraguayan courts. Meanwhile, it sought to cast Joelito’s death as a case of domestic 
violence rather than police torture in order to “muddy the waters enough to create doubt among the 
international human rights NGOs” (89). In response to the Inter-American Commission, the regime 
resorted to its “usual stalling tactic” to keep its international accusers at bay (141). When this proved 
ineffective, the regime sought to portray criticisms as part of an international human rights 
conspiracy that not only threatened national sovereignty but attacked Paraguay’s honor as well (228-
230). 
While the regime sought to deny and deflect the charges against it, it was also compelled to make 
certain concessions. White reports that “Stroessner reacted to this onslaught of domestic and 
international problems with compromise and concession—and not repression—for damage 
control” (123). On the domestic front, the government transferred dozens of prisoners from secret 
police dungeons to less appalling prison facilities in order to secure opposition cooperation for 
Stroessner’s reelection plans (121-122). On the international front, Stroessner realized that “high-
powered scrutiny from powerful U.S. officials made it too risky to harass the Filártigas and their 
friends” (163). Similarly, the immediate mobilization of international protest following the arrest of 
an opposition politician forced his release and compelled the regime to retract legislation that 
threatened to revoke the citizenship of anyone who criticized the regime while abroad (180-181). 
Yet unlike the virtuous spiral set in motion by the theoretical model, the case of Paraguay shows 
that reversals also occur. Whereas the spiral model suggests that most obstacles are at the beginning 
of the process and that, once underway, the process acquires a momentum that makes reversals 
difficult, actual events in Paraguay cast doubts upon this optimistic reading. While Stroessner was 
willing to engage in a few face-saving measures in order to bolster his regime’s credibility, he did not 
hesitate to crack down when he felt truly threatened. Although he could not do anything to prevent 
international human rights NGOs from continuing their campaign, he could and did crack down on 
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opponents in Paraguay, where he “unleashed his police and hunkered down to ride out the storm” 
(129). White makes it clear that the regime skillfully used fear and paranoia to undermine opponents 
of the regime and their supporters (168-169). In fact, Paraguay’s experience suggests that even 
though states may change their rhetoric and adopt minor corrective actions in order to assuage 
powerful international patrons, once the crisis is over, reversal is quite possible (Schwarz 2004: 208-
210). 
Within this context, the Paraguayan case suggests that international human rights norms have 
not experienced a steady, continuous increase in power and legitimacy but have waxed and waned 
with variations in the international context. As Susan Burgerman has argued, in order for 
transnational human rights activism to produce actual changes in state policy or behavior, the 
“structural context must be permissive,” that is, no major state can strongly oppose international 
cooperation with human rights efforts (1998: 907). While White points to a “power shift in the 
human rights community” symbolized by the decision to grant Amnesty International the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1977, he also provides evidence that human rights gained international salience in 
large part because of the Carter administration’s determination to use human rights to regain the 
moral high ground (151-152). In contrast, once the Reagan administration came to power in 1981, 
human rights lost ground to Cold War considerations. Encouraged by the fact that the United States 
no longer deemed Paraguay to be a gross violator of human rights and buoyed by the resumption of 
economic aid, the Stroessner regime was confident enough to drop all semblances of working for 
justice (272). This suggests that Paraguay’s leaders did not move beyond the third stage of tactical 
concessions; rather than working to overcome Paraguay’s negative international reputation by 
adopting the rhetoric of human rights, they bided their time, waiting for the international context to 
change. 
While Paraguay’s experience shows the importance of the international context for moving 
violator states toward greater compliance with human rights norms, it also shows the weaknesses of 
international institutions and non-state actors (Schwarz 2004: 203-204). Without the backing of the 
U.S. government, Paraguay’s leaders would not have been convinced to make any concessions. Even 
though “the emergence of crimes against humanity as a distinct category of norms as well as the 
principle of individual responsibility have taken firm root in the international community,” 
international tribunals and the International Criminal Court have not proven particularly effective in 
enforcing international law (Bianchi 1999: 97-98). It has therefore been up to domestic courts in 
countries like the United States to hold individuals, including former heads of state, accountable for 
crimes against humanity. As legal scholar Andrea Bianchi argues, both theoretical and practical 
considerations mandate that domestic courts work to implement international human rights law: 
theoretically, “the very essence of the notion of individual crimes is that they threaten the 
international community as a whole and that any state is entitled to punish them. On a more 
practical level, the absence of any permanent international criminal tribunal makes international 
prosecution merely illusory” (1999: 108-109). While the International Criminal Court has come into 
existence since Bianchi wrote these words, the opposition of the United States continues to 
undermine its effectiveness and the Court has not tried a case since its creation in July 2002. 
At the same time, however, it is important to remember that for all their current limitations, 
international tribunals may become effective agents of international human rights law in the future. 
In the landmark case of Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium (2002), the International Court of 
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Justice raised just such a possibility, ruling that only international tribunals—not foreign states—may 
override the immunity of acting heads of state or foreign ministers. In this case, the ICJ ruled that 
Belgium had overstepped its legal prerogatives by issuing an arrest warrant against the acting foreign 
minister of Congo on charges of inciting violence against Tutsi citizens in his country; nonetheless, 
the ICJ ruled that  
 
where multilateral treaties and other instruments purport to supersede immunity from prosecution, the decision 
in Congo v. Belgium—which was based on the rules of customary international law—does not override their 
explicit language. That means that Congo v. Belgium poses no obstacle to the proceedings of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, or the 
coming International Criminal Court (Dorf 2002).  
 
More recently, despite its long-standing opposition to the Court, the United States agreed to allow 
the ICC to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses in Darfur in Western Sudan (Simons 
2005). 
These developments hold out future promise for international tribunals and organizations; 
progress to date, however, has been restricted to domestic courts, as Breaking Silence shows. While 
human rights defenders were certainly heartened by the publication in 1978 of a scathing report by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that hammered away at institutionalized human 
rights abuses in Paraguay, White notes that the report did not cause the regime to ease up on 
repression and, if anything, conditions for political prisoners worsened (178). In order to achieve 
some measure of justice, the Filártiga family and their supporters ultimately wound up pursuing legal 
action in U.S. courts. In what initially seemed like a far-fetched strategy, lawyers for the family 
invoked the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, which authorizes U.S. district courts to exercise original 
jurisdiction in a suit brought by one alien (in this case, the victim’s sister) against another alien (the 
alleged perpetrator) for an act committed in violation of the law of nations. Joelito’s murder 
qualified since the UN Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, American Convention on 
Human Rights and UN Declaration on Torture all make torture a violation of the law of nations. 
Through many twists and turns, White describes how U.S. courts ultimately came to issue a $10.4 
million judgment in favor of the Filártigas, thereby demonstrating that U.S. “courts are open to 
judge actions in any corner of the world” (279). 
For optimistic defenders of such human rights litigation, internationalized prosecutions such as 
Filártiga v. Peña “will deter violence, redress victims, secure public order, permit national 
reconciliation, and establish the truth by preserving the historical record in a courtroom setting,” but 
other scholars warn that this rosy picture may be misleading (Mathews 2003: 274). Proceedings tend 
to be lengthy and complicated, and access to witnesses, materials, information tends to be 
inadequate. In the Filártiga case that White describes, the huge monetary reward turned out to be 
purely symbolic—the Filártiga family never received any part of the $10.4 million award, since Peña 
had long since returned to Paraguay. Back in Paraguay, the courts dismissed the Filártigas’ charges 
that Joelito was a victim of torture and upheld the regime’s explanation that Joelito had been killed 
in a crime of passion. To add insult to injury, the courts ruled that Joelito’s alleged murderer—the 
cuckolded husband—had temporarily lost control and was not responsible for his actions. This 
ruling reflects a widespread tendency in many countries throughout the world to exonerate domestic 
8
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violence, deeming “crimes of passion” to be natural and even legitimate (Finley and Dickstein 1997: 
21). The Filártiga family was ordered to pay for all court costs as well as damages awarded for 
slander and defamation of character.  
Moreover, those individuals charged by the family with complicity in the crime or in defending 
the regime against human rights charges wound up enjoying lucrative positions—even after 
Stroessner was overthrown in a military coup in February 1989. Yet when asked whether the family’s 
efforts had been in vain, Joel Filártiga vehemently affirms that “in a life of permanent opposition, 
the effort becomes the goal… we have broken the silence of people to speak out. The taboo of 
shame and fear that the dictatorship has always counted on to cover up its crimes.… Our struggle 
has opened a channel of hope” (281). While retributive justice might seem to demand that 
perpetrators are punished, the mere act of bringing perpetrators to trial can play a significant role in 
allowing victims and their families to tell their stories; this can serve justice by uncovering the truth 
and exposing the false narrative of repressive regimes (Phelps 2004: 41, 61-62). Moreover, the 
Filártiga case has left an important legacy, triggering progeny cases that have been used to punish 
crimes against humanity as well as international environmental and labor rights law (286). In a 
contemporary case, a former Salvadoran military official living in the United States is currently being 
sued for damages in the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, as human rights defenders 
once again invoke the Alien Torts Claim Act to try to hold individuals civilly liable for gross 
violations of human rights accountable for their crimes. Since the accused man is in hiding and is 
being tried in absentia, it is unclear whether the Archbishop’s relatives would ever be able to collect 
monetary damages (Menchu Tum 2004). For the Archbishop’s family, however, the case is not 
about money but justice, that is, about ensuring that the assassin is not free to go about with 
impunity.  
The inspiring story of the Filártigas that is chronicled by Richard Alan White shows both the 
promise and the limits of efforts to reshape international and domestic norms. Foreign nationals 
seeking justice in American courts for atrocities committed in their own countries have made 
limited, though not insignificant gains in recent years. While justice has been only imperfectly served, 
the fact that any justice has been achieved at all reflects the extraordinary efforts of human rights 
defenders. Furthermore, to the extent that this case and others like it demonstrate that authorities 
who commit or condone human rights may eventually be held accountable for their actions, the 
power of human rights norms increases. While some governments may hunker down and ride out 
the storm, as was the case in Stroessner’s Paraguay, most governments confront real pressure to 
respect human rights in order to maintain good international standing. The current dilemma of 
Francisco Flores, former president of El Salvador, shows the kind of pressure that human rights can 
bring to bear. While Salvadoran presidents have blatantly disregarded calls to investigate a 1981 
massacre, Mr. Flores now finds that his chances of being named secretary general of the OAS have 
been tarnished by his failure to act (Urbina 2005).  
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